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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to open a conversation regarding the role of
grammar in two areas of philosophy: interpretation and normative philosophy. The task is
divided into three chapters, each of which focuses on one major issue. The first is a
demonstration of the use of grammar in understanding and interpreting works of
philosophy, namely those of Hegel and Marx. The second chapter is an interpretation of
Franz Rosenzweig’s renovated grammar, as seen in The Star of Redemption. The last uses
an analysis of grammar to challenge the role of empirical knowledge in community
building. The last chapter is an application of the method discussed in chapters one and
two, but its objective is to raise the fundamental question of this thesis: is it morally
beneficial to rely on an empirical approach to understanding community formation? My
claim is that perhaps we should because it would be better, acknowledge that individuals
stand for themselves and not as a representative of a category. If we premise our moral
decision making with this in mind, which is actually to say, if we disregard what we think
of others based on their contingent qualities, we might not be predisposed to act towards
them in an immoral way.
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CHAPTER 1: USING GRAMMAR TO INTERPRET COMPLICATED
SYSTEMS OF LOGIC
A will that concludes nothing is not an actual will; a characterless human being
never comes to conclude. The ground of indecision may also lie in a faintheartedness that knows that, in willing something determinate, it is engaging with
finitude, positing a restriction for itself and forsaking the infinite… only by
resolving do human beings step into actuality, however bitter this may be.1
In this chapter, I take an in-depth look at the structures of some of the logical
developments and claims in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. As will become apparent, his
description of the will is a direct result of the application of his logic. My aim is not to defend
Hegel’s claims nor explain them on his terms. Instead, I move forward under the premise that
those descriptions used by Hegel serve us well in our examination of what I term the voice of
grammar to come. There is not a clear-cut discussion of grammar in either the Logic or the
Philosophy of Right. In these works, Hegel makes no mention of the grammatical categories of
active and passive living—though he alludes to the idea.2 What results from my analysis of
Hegel’s view of the will is not an all-encompassing definition of the will, but a description of
Hegel’s will that is in line with the notion of renovated grammar.3 The discussion of Hegel’s
notion of the will, in this case, does not lead to the political philosophy of Hegel’s state, but to a
discussion of the possibility of understanding personal and intrapersonal relationships through a
grasp of the language we use to create those relationships. In other words, by demonstrating the
parallels between Hegel’s logic and view of the will, I will be able to demonstrate that grammar

1

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 26
In the latter part of this argument I demonstrate how Hegel’s notion of concluding and the free will are actually
comprehensible through the grammatical distinction of the active and passive voice.
3 This concept will be developed in detail in chapter two of this work. My claim here is that Hegel’s view of the will
can be understood through an analysis of the meaning that is conveyed by grammar.
2
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can serve a similar function to logic. In the second part of this first chapter, I will look to Marx
for the same purpose, namely to identity some of the possible applications of the method I am
here using.
In Hegel’s Logic, he describes and applies several concepts that are paramount to
understanding how he will develop his view of the will. Hegel presupposed that those who
undertook to understand the Philosophy of Right had a working knowledge of his Logic.4
Perhaps dedicated readers of Hegel’s work will opine that the following exposition of the
parallels is superfluous. This thesis requires the explanation for two reasons: a) the Logic
describes a set of rules needed to establish a working definition of the will; and b) having seen
how these terms work in two different contexts allows us to see how grammar is capable of
creating a similar understanding of the will without taking on the entirety of Hegel’s system.
The standard defining character of idealism is that being, as an ontological category, is
but the contents of the mind.5 Criticism of Hegelian idealism has been by and large grounded on
the interpretation of the following mischaracterization: being = thought. Tucker, in his
Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, argues that Hegel’s notion of truth is that reality becomes
content of subjectivity. He says, “[man’s] desire to know…is a craving in man to pierce the
seeming objectivity of the world that confronts him and grasp it as subjective in nature […].”
It should be noted that this reductive interpretation is not necessarily a deliberate
misrepresentation, for Hegel does use the term idealism because, after all, he is a self-proclaimed
idealist. However, if considered without further consideration of the whole system, we might be
inclined to believe that being and thought are interchangeable. I would argue, however, that
4 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,36
5 I am here referring to the accepted notion of idealism as defined by the Stanford encyclopedia entry on idealism as
“something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of
reality…” see Guyer, Idealism.
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applying such a sorry label of idealism to Hegel is not only shameful but comes off as lazy.
Thus, to conclude from Hegel’s use of words like mind, spirit, idealism, reason, etc., that he is an
idealist without further ado, is to say no more than that Hegel’s idealism is no different from that
of Berkeley’s.
The key to Hegel’s thinking is the dialectic because applying it allows us to see how
concepts develop and change over time. As I lay down some central points in the Logic, we will
see that it is not the case that being=thought. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that being
serves a similar function to thought, i.e., they are parallels when we abstract them. In the latter
case, we are left with the simple characterization, being ∥ thought6. It describes the mental
process that considers how thinking itself is involved in the way we experience the world around
us. On a macro-scale, Hegel claims that world history is the rational understanding of the
development of a people, their ideas, and their nation-states. Below we will see an example of
this process by considering the logical concept of determination in two distinct contexts: logic
and political right. The development of these concepts in Hegel’s work is dialectical because old
tired concepts do not lose significance as a society, and people move beyond them. They live on
in the sense that, having been overcome, they still premise newer (and more current)
conclusions, even if only to avoid the negative consequences those ideas had in the past. In other
cases, world-historical cultures and religious ideas preserve these ideas. According to Hegel,
when talking about logic—and as we will see, this extends to grammar—imposing an a priori
definition is a mistake. He maintains that dialectical thinking is best able to avoid positing for

6

Hegel, Logic, 59. Hegel suggests that pure being and thought are equal, but I argue they are more conceptual
parallels in that they both serve as starting points, than analytically identical.
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ourselves external labels7 by allowing us to see how cognition can discover a concept’s meaning
from the contradicting experiences that surround it.
For my thesis, I need to say more about the dialectic. Hegel himself points out conceptual
change at every step of his work and I will follow his lead. The following chart lays out some of
the concepts he develops dialectically in each of the works considered here:
The Logic

The Philosophy of Right

Logical Abstraction

Abstract Thought

Pure Being & Nothing

Universality & finitude (§5&6)

Determination

Free will

Constitution

Personhood

The chart is structured to show that “logical abstraction” is to the left of “thought” to
represent the claim that Hegel uses both terms for the same reason and at the same point in his
argument in different contexts, the Logic and The Philosophy of Right respectively. To remain
consistent with what I called the macro-scale of applying the dialectic, Hegel often cites
historical developments in philosophy to structure his narrative. For this reason, he opens his
Logic with the concept of pure being considering them as the Eleatics did, abstractly.8 Hegel’s
starting point in the Philosophy of Right is the same starting point he chooses in his logic—
abstract thought, meaning that the starting point for dialectical thinking is abstract thought as
well. As I noted in the chart above, the logical abstraction of being and thought are both concepts
without determinations. Hegel says it in this way: “the will contains the element of pure

7
8

Hegel, Logic,34
For Hegel’s commentary of the Eleatics and their use of the concept of pure being see Hegel, Logic, 60
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indetermination…”9 As I noted above, thinking dialectically, history gives testimony to the
importance of “pure being” and “thought qua thought.” According to Hegel, this is verifiable if
we look at the development of abstract thought—as a concept—in the religious zeal of the Indian
culture:
Historically, this form of freedom comes forth often. In India, for example, what is
held to be the highest is for one to persevere merely in the knowledge of one's
simple identity with oneself, to abide within this empty space of one’s interiority
as in the colorless light of pure intuition, and to renounce every activity of living,
every goal, every representation.10
Moving forward, what is of interest is how he describes and moves from these starting points and
not whether he was justified in choosing that point, to begin with.
This process demands that Hegel’s readers are willing to think about thinking because he
proposes that when we think about something, by the fact that we thought about it, give that
something a determination. In other words, to think of something is to give it a type of
determination. Hegel asks us to think about pure being, a concept he considers without
determination, but at the same time, he argues that this concept cannot be defined because it has
no determination. This process of abstraction is paradoxical because: to define an un-determined
thing is impossible because the definition implies determination. This is what Hegel says on the
matter, “being, pure being— [is] without further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy,
it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within
it, nor outwardly.”11 He adds: “there is nothing to be intuited in it if one can speak here of
intuiting; or it is only this pure empty intuiting itself…it is equally only this empty thinking.”
The paradoxical nature of such an abstraction should be apparent as I have explained it.

9

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 20
Ibidem. See remarks
11 Hegel, Logic, 59
10
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Additionally, Hegel’s description serves a point carried forward by my thesis that being is not
equal to thought, but parallel to it.12
As it pertains to the dialectic, it is essential to note that Hegel will equate pure being and
pure nothing, meaning that both concepts have no determinations. As far as pure being and pure
nothing is concerned, Hegel has his readers consider the difference in looking at a blinding white
light as pure being and a pitch blackness as nothing. In each case, there is nothing distinguishable
within the blinding white light nor pitch blackness. Consequently, we can assert that given the
lack of determination in both, we can see that equating one to the other is not indefensible. It
seems as if Hegel has said only two things: first, that being cannot be defined because doing so
means giving it determination in thought. Second, that one can think of thought of as a vessel
which itself cannot be defined until it has content. The parallel should be clear, from a logical
standpoint, pure being and pure nothing are indeterminate starting points. As we move towards
the will, thought will take the place of the starting point.
It might be difficult to imagine why some philosophers make use of undefinable
concepts. Rudolph Carnap argued that “…the logical analysis of the pretended propositions of
metaphysics has shown that they are not propositions at all, but empty word arrays, which on
account of notional and emotional connections arouse the false appearance of being
propositions.” 13 Despite the reasons marshaled against such a starting point, Hegel uses “logical
abstractions” to show that cognition can understand change when we observe historical
narratives of this change or when our conception of certain concepts evolves.14 Dialectical
thinking is the conceptualization of the idea that we experience an objective world that appears

12

See footnote number 7 above.
Carnap, On the Character of Philosophic Problems, 5
14 Here we might think of how our concept of social justice has changed over time. The very idea of social justice is
dialectical in this context because it is anchored to a particular epoch. I will revisit this notion in chapter three.
13
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to be, in a sense, static. Moreover, the difference within things is only a difference for a third
thing that notices those differences. The understanding is the third thing to which difference
belongs.15 The dialectic is useful because it gives us one way through which to understand the
role of reason in knowing something about the world.
The dialectical claim that pure being and nothing are the same is the chief example
[Beispiel16] in Hegel’s Logic. He maintains that if we point out their difference, we have already
created in them some determination, these concepts do not have, which is the paradox that I
mentioned previously. If being and nothing are the same, how is it that things have or do not
have being? The dialectical moment appears in our thoughts, as if it were an epiphany, in the
realization that being and nothing exist as moments belonging to another concept. What do these
logical abstractions have to do with what we call reality? Hegel tells us that we do not have to
look for being and nothing in the world. Instead, we must always learn to see how seeming
contradictions always seem to resolve themselves through their unity. In this context,
experiencing the concept of becoming is the transition out of the metaphysics of pure idealism.
We can grasp the whole of the Hegelian dialectic if we wrap our mind around how he says being,
and nothing come together in thought to understand things we experience as something
determined. Namely, that as logical abstraction, they cannot be defined, but, in their unity, in
becoming, things have determination. The coming together of being and nothing, Hegel suggests,
denotes the process of coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be. Following the pre-Socratics,17 Hegel
maintains, “…there is nothing which is not an intermediary state between being and [not
being],”18 and the dialectic is the lens through which we capture it. Hegel takes this notion that

15

Hegel, Encyclopedia, 180
Bei =with/in & Spiel = play
17 Reference Pre-Socratics for their concepts on movement.
18 Hegel, Logic, 80
16
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everything is in flux unapologetically, saying, “such dialectic is, however, at least more
consistent than ordinary reflective thought.”19
Language complicates our discussion of the dialectic because we tend to use finite verbs
that produce sentences that paint a static picture of a state of affairs. Arguably, the case could be
made that the present progressive can convey the moment to moment present passing of time.
Nevertheless, the actual movement from one state of affairs to the next is not experienced by
reading or hearing language. Thus, “today is day,”20 is true—until it is not. The dialectic
demands that our focus shift from the static nature of statements to an experience of movement.
Marx understood that this was the nature of the dialectic. In the Economic Manuscripts, he wrote
of Hegel’s view of the family, society and the state, “they have become moments of motion.”
Furthermore, since truth cannot lose anything by the passing of time, truth—for Hegel—
is to be found in the movement we experience, literally in the passing of day to night, and not in
the statement of a fact, like “today is day.” The dialectic demands a focus on this shift while not
losing sight of the moments that make up point a and point b. Thus, we derive the very definition
of Aufhebung or sublation, which is perhaps the most important term in the Hegelian lexicon.
To sublate and being sublated constitute one of the most important concepts of
philosophy. It is a fundamental determination that repeatedly occurs everywhere in
it, the meaning of which must be grasped with precision and primarily distinguished
from nothing. – what is sublated does not thereby turn into nothing. [Pure] [n]othing
is the immediate; something sublated is on the contrary something mediated [my
emphasis]; it is something non-existent but as a result that has preceded from a
being; it still has in itself, therefore the determinateness from which it derives.21
To sublate is the act by which the understanding applies the cognitive process of
dialectical thinking. The result of this action is the mediation that brings about the determination

19

Ibid., 79
Hegel will use this phrase in his phenomenology of spirit to convey the notion of movement when discussing
truth.
21 Hegel, Logic, 81
20
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of a concept which necessarily arises from considering the multiple sides of things. In the Logic,
Hegel used being and nothing to show how the concept of becoming is not arbitrarily defined.
The Philosophy of Right demonstrates Hegel’s masterful application of dialectical thinking in its
context—the context of the political right. Hegel describes the dialectical progression of political
history—what he calls universal/world history—to the concepts of universality and finitude. The
dialectic can be identified when one grapples with two opposing features of a third unifying
concept. In the context of his political work, we can identify the dialectical juxtaposition of
“every self-consciousness [knowing] itself as universal—as the possibility of abstracting from
everything determinate—and as particular, as having a determinate object, content, and aim.”22
In this quote, the two opposing features are a) self-consciousness and b) consciousness of
something other than itself. The religious zeal of the Indian religion and the idea that
determination defines by negation represent these features. At this point, progressing through the
chart above, I suggest that determination is an activity of the understanding which can be at work
through language structures.
It is the function of focusing our attention on something other than oneself that prompt
Hegel to develop his view of the concept of constitution:
Constituted in this or that way, the something is caught up in external influences
and in external relationships. This external connection on which the constitution
depends, and the being determined through another, appear as something
accidental. But it is the quality of the something to appear as something accidental.
But it is the quality of the something to be given over to this externality and to have
a constitution.23
Constitution is the recognition that dialectical thinking guides the understanding to see that
things are defined not only from what is their essence but from their relationship with other

22
23

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 22
Hegel, Logic, 96
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things. Through the dichotomy of finite and infinite Hegel develops the concept of the will,
because, as I pointed out before, it is a function of the mind to recognize the difference in things.
Moreover, once recognized, limits are themselves negated when we come to understand them.
Hegel means that it is the will that reconciles a positive and a negative. By accepting the notion
of finitude, Hegel is rejecting Spinoza’s notion of substance on the basis that limits are
something to overcome, not explain away. Constitution is that external and contingent thing one
must make one’s own—come to know—if one is to be considered free, free from negation, that
is. It is in this sense that Hegel’s famous “negation of negation” makes sense.
At this point in the logic, Hegel’s readers can choose a path: continue thinking about
thought or take a turn into a discussion of the application of it. The former entails the further
reading of Hegel’s work on logic and nature; the latter means working through the Philosophy of
Right. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes the development of the “self-conscious spirit,”
that is, human beings. The process of thinking I have been describing Hegel attributes to humans
in general. It allows Hegel to say that “[h]uman beings, […] stand above their drives wholly
undetermined, and can determine and posit them as their own.”24 Through the voluntary activity,
we can move beyond the limits.
The dialectical shift from the will as purely a cognitive process25 to personhood goes
beyond the two moments of the will described above. When we think, we eventually consider the
object of our thought as our own, as if we appropriate the thought as our self-given thought, and
we think we give ourselves this or that thought. Hegel, however, maintains that some of the
contents of our thinking are “natural drives,” such as hunger. While at the same time, he suggests

24

Hegel, Philosophy of Right,25 POR
Hegel claims that the understanding the will as two moments of different cognitive activities is the work of the
understanding. Given the position of the understanding in the phenomenology of spirit, we can speculate that he
doesn’t believe this bifurcated understanding of the will is as important as the what comes after it.
25
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feeling hungry does not constitute freedom—because it is a natural drive—but recognizing
hunger as one’s own imposed state of being that is a step in the right direction. Here the choice to
eat is a moment of self-determination, a seemingly free act of cognition. The difference I am
pointing to is that between eating instinctively and planning ahead of time to satisfy one’s
cravings and bodily needs. As Hegel develops this logic, we arrive at personhood as the
sublation of both self-imposed and external limits placed on the will. The will can posit
restriction as its own and then cross that limit is becoming free. The most noteworthy claim in
Hegel’s view here is that making limits one’s own is a particular form of thinking.
The distinction between thinking and willing is only that between theoretical and
practical component, but there are not two faculties; on the contrary, the will is a
particular way of thinking, thinking is translating itself into existence, as the drive
to give itself existence. For only in thinking am I at home with myself. 26
I want to call attention to Hegel’s choice of words. The descriptions found in
Hegel’s work lend themselves to a grammatical rendition of the same concepts. The
words, “drive to give itself existence” suggests that there is something about human
thinking, a form of subjectivity, that becomes objective or constituted by material reality.
As Hegel identifies more and more external constitutions that consciousness can make its
own, he reaches the idea of personhood.
What follows from personhood is that I, as this person, am completely determined
in all respects (in terms of inner willfulness drives and desires as well as by
existence that is immediate and external.) I am thus finite, yet nevertheless pure
relation to myself, so that I know myself within this finitude as infinite, universal,
and free.27
The development of the logic and the will happen almost hand by hand. Hegel develops
one by developing the other; this is how Hegel can create a systematic philosophy. My
26
27

Hegel, Philosophy of Right 18
Ibid.,40
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claim in this chapter is that having seen Hegel develop his logic and will on the same
principle, we are now able to compare how grammatical concepts roughly align with
crucial parts of Hegel’s work. Consider the chart below where I have added the new
concepts that I consider paramount:
The Logic

The Philosophy of Right

This Thesis

Logical abstraction

Abstract thought

Grammar

Pure being and nothing

Universality and finitude

Spoken language and
symbols

Determination

Free will

Nouns and verbs

Constitution

Personhood

Voice

Hegel himself makes a case for the first parallel in the Logic;
He who is beginning to make his acquaintance with grammar finds in its forms, and
laws dry abstractions, arbitrary rules, quite, in general, a disconnected aggregate of
definitions that have no other value or meaning than what they immediately signify;
at the start, there is nothing to be known in them except themselves.28
My point is that grammar, like the dialectic, rules over the cognitive process that allows
us to understand how concepts develop. The changes that Hegel says that consciousness
understands through proper thinking may be the result of the nature of spoken languages
and symbols. Language grammar allows us to see how different parts of speech relate to
each other. Hegel believes that language expresses universals,29 which suggests that the
meaning of these concepts exists beyond language. I am demonstrating that language
contests with dialectical logic in this ability to bring about determination, i.e., meaning.

28
29

Hegel, Logic, 36
Hegel believed that language only expressed universals, historically this is connected to Plato’s forms.
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Talking about developed languages presupposes how languages came about, but
we must not answer the question of how to point out some of its obvious uses. For
instance, nouns, verbs, and other parts of speech are given semantic meaning in part by
syntactic order. The grammatical order gives us analytic truth as in the sentence, “the
stork ate the frog,”30 for example. The most elementary understanding of Nouns, for
example, is that they get meaning from their determination. Quite literally, they allow the
speaker to point out a person, place, thing, or idea. The function of dialectical logic to
bring determination to concepts through sublation is similar to the function of nouns—as
grammatical concepts—to determine particular things. If we do not determine nouns,
they are like being and nothing, pure abstractions. I am only pointing to the difference
between an utterance and an utterance we call a noun; the difference is that the latter has
determination.
Consider the nature of a verb: one of the principal parts of a verb is its infinitive
form. In this form, the verb denotes an act but as unrelated to anything but itself. In other
words, this form of the verb is undetermined, much like being and nothing are pure
abstractions that are undetermined. For example, to eat has no determination because it is
not conjugated. The conjugated form of the verb gives it determination and meaning
because it determines the who and when of the verb. For example, he, she, it, eats.
Dialectically, the unity of undetermined concepts, like being and nothing, comes into
being with grammatical structure. Words begin to determine each other in ways they
cannot without their context, meaning that grammar brings determination to the set of
words: “you the reader are reading this sentence.”

30

Rosenzweig, Star, 119
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Having seen that determination has its place in grammar, we arrive at constitution
as the moment of the dialect dealing with outer limits. In the Logic, we see that “[t]his
external connection [i.e., the externally imposed limit] on which the constitution depends,
and the [subject’s] being determined through another, appear as something accidental.”31
Outer limits are those imposed on something by something other than itself. In a political
sense, the constitution outlines the scope of government drawing a line separating matters
of the state and private matters. The corresponding concept, Personhood, is the moving
about of a subject among its internal and external limits. Hegel spells this out more
concretely in The Philosophy of Right. There the reader must understand that Hegel is no
longer talking about thinking—as in the Logic—but he is describing a subject as
experiencing the dialectic’s progression. Hegel is a phenomenologist!
In §35 of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes this phenomenological point
explicit. He says that a “‘person’ is essentially different from [a] ‘subject,’ since ‘subject’
is only the possibility of personhood; every living thing of any sort is a subject.”32 The
shift I described above is Hegel’s shift from talking about logic to talking about the will
leads this conversation to the concept of personhood. This was appropriate because by
talking about Hegel’s work, works like this one use subjective judgment to think and talk
about what Hegel has been saying. So, it is the person that deliberates and judges not only
of these ideas but on the material world.
As immediate individuality, a person in making decisions is related to extant nature,
and thus the personhood of the will stands over against this world of nature as
something subjective. But because personhood is in itself infinite and universal, the
restriction of being only subject is for it contradictory and nullifying. Through its

31
32

Hegel, Logic, 96.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 41
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deeds, personhood suspends this restriction by giving itself reality, or, in other
words, by positing that that existence as its own.33
Personhood, in this sense, is expressed through the grammatical voice. Grammatical
voice is “an indication, with transitive verbs (those that can take direct objects), of
whether the subject performs the action (the active voice) or receives it ([the] passive
[voice]).”34 Hegel claims that “[w]hat is rational about property is not that it satisfies
needs but rather that it suspends the mere subjectivity of personhood.”35 It is as the author
of this thesis, my intellectual property before you, that I have transcended my subjectivity
and have created an objective state of affairs: “You the reader are reading this thesis.”
I intend to demonstrate the way that Hegel put these concepts together creates
ideas that language grammar is capable of conveying. What we have in personhood is a
complex organization of concepts; Hegel is not just dropping it in unadorned. The same
can be said of grammatical voice. Subject nouns, through actions, i.e., verbs like eating,
express phenomenological realities like taking a natural drive, e.g., hunger, and
determining them as one’s own. Craving a particular food is the subjective activity of
taking hunger and expressing it as one’s desire. At the same time, if understood through
the question of how language functions, the subjective experience of going beyond one’s
limits, enables us to understand better how transcending subjectivity is not a mystical
conception. This transcendence is further de-mystified when we give the language its
proper position. Hunger and cravings seem like an arbitrary comparison, but the voice of
the verbs allows us to have a visual of the relation between subject and verb. Nota bene:
grammatical voice allows us to see the semantic direction.

33

Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 42
Wheelock, Wheelock’s Latin, 2
35 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 44
34
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•

Active voice: Noun (subject) àAction (verb)àNoun (object)
o I am eating this [because I am hungry].

•

Passive voice: Noun (subject) ß Action (verb) / agency requires a
prepositional phrase in English.
o I am struck with hunger [by a physiological need].

This thesis opened with a quote by Hegel, which should now have a more
apparent significance. “A will that concludes nothing is not an actual will…”36 this is
because personhood thinks, speaks, then surpasses its limitations. The physiological need
for hunger is not something one has a say in. In that sense, we consider it something that
takes action upon us: “I am hungry” is a realization, not a choice. Similarly, with love, we
are struck with cupid’s arrow and can no longer resist that person that commands our
love. The voice of a verb is not difficult to express because it merely asks who affects and
who is affected. Sublation, on the other hand, as a cancellation and upbringing is far more
difficult to express with arrows, so I do not attempt that. Despite that difficulty, sublation
is no less a type of movement we understand through language. Language has the superb
capacity to express the idea that personhood transcends its self-determination like being
struck by a love arrow or craving a sandwich. In both cases, we see ourselves as affected
and then choose whether to transcend the affection with some kind of active action, like
sending a letter or making a sandwich. In the next chapter, I will discuss how grammar
plays a role in personhood in the context of the work of Franz Rosenzweig.
For the remainder of the present chapter, I will be considering language in some of
Marx’s work. Before interpreting Marx, I want to make an historical point: it seems that Marx
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wrote about Hegel in the same way that Aristotle wrote about Plato. Both Marx and Aristotle
seem to deny a metaphysics wherein the immaterial precedes material reality. Aristotle said of
Plato’s Forms, “[…] of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is
convincing…”37 In On the Terminology of ‘Abstraction’ in Aristotle, John Cleary describes the
traditional view of abstraction in Aristotle’s corpus. Namely, “[t]he traditional view has been that
he is referring to some epistemological process of abstraction from matter, by means of which
mathematical objects (along with other universals) are isolated from sensible particulars for the
purposes of scientific knowledge.”38 Despite Cleary’s opposition to this view, I think this
expresses what Marx was doing quite well.
In De partibus Animalium, Aristotle argues that a study of nature cannot begin with the
counting of the individual peculiarities of each kind of animal. Doing so, he argues, would create
an analysis that shows too much repetition. Instead, he proposed that:
The best course [of action] appears to be that we should follow the method already
mentioned and begin with the phenomena presented by each group of animals, and
when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the causes of those phenomena and
to deal with their evolution.39
Aristotle describes a two-part process: first, a scientific study should begin with “the
phenomena” or the way things are; second, proceed to explain the evolution or process by
which these things came to be.
Marx’s early work is characteristically Aristotelean in the sense that it is a study
of nature concerned with the phenomena itself. Marx proclaimed, “Man is a natural
being,”40 and he studied him as such. Moreover, just as Aristotle laid down a critique of
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Plato’s Forms, Marx says, “the entire Logic is the demonstration that abstract thought is
nothing in itself; that the Absolute Idea is nothing in itself, that only Nature is
something.”41 The historical point I am making serves to exemplify the analytic
relationship of categories to history, its present, and the future. It is evident that Marx is
not an exemption. He did not create a system by which to analyze nature and categorize
her. It is my position here that Marx exemplifies a masterful application of the conceptual
way that science categorizes our world.
It is noteworthy to say again that Marx famously criticized Hegel for filling the
contents of his dialectical logic with mysticism and abstractions of thought. Then Marx
presented his alternative and defined it in this way:
[Historical materialism] has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period
[sought] to look for a category, but constantly remains on the real ground of history;
it does not explain from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material
practice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of
consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism…42
This move to a more material understanding of the world does as Aristotle suggested.
Namely, it begins with the material phenomena and proceeds to create an explanation of
how such a state of affairs came to be. For my purpose, it will suffice to do two things: to
show that despite his claims, Marx indeed used categories to explain economic and
historical phenomena; and to explain the role of language grammar in conveying these
ideas through the declension of nouns.
As Marx attempts to describe the world scientifically, he avoids categories. In
The German Ideology, he says,
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the
41
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real individual, their activity, and the material condition under which they live, both
those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These
premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.43
What Marx empirically verifies is the conditions of the working people in the advent of
the industrial revolution; in these premises, Marx had the phenomena to be explained. In
each case, he asserts, that these conditions had a beginning, and therefore, a history. He
remarks, “[t]he first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these
needs, the production of material life itself.” I should point out that I am not focused on
whether this claim is correct. Instead, I want us to think about the possibility that Marx
was indeed engaged in what I will now call the scientific image of the world44.
This scientific image in every case leads down the same road. I will say more
about this view in the next chapter; here I need only point to one of the features of this
world view: despite Marx’s focus on the material reality of individuals and the hardships
that the working class endured during the industrial revolution, etc., his analysis
eventually abstracts to the point where categories, and not individuals, are the subject at
hand. What I am not doing here is raising objections or challenges to his conception of
history, his labor-theory of value, nor his call for revolution. Instead, I am drawing
attention to the use of categories and the worldview they tend to create. Given this
interpretation of Marx, I find it difficult to support using this knowledge as a means to
create normative ethics. That will be the topic for the next chapter in this thesis.
Previously, we saw that Hegel guides his readers from the consideration of logical
abstractions to a discussion of personhood. In terms of progression, I want to ask how
Marx begins with the definite individual—this empirical reality—and ends with
43
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categorial representations? The matter is complicated because Marx asserts that “Life is
not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”45 History, as the
“production of material life,” admits of uncritical use of the linguistic modes of empirical
descriptions. Thus, Marx moves from the individual to a collective category because of
the nature of his empirical inquiry. He resists considering the individual in a Hegelian
fashion (as noted above) because, among other things, the scientific method itself, i.e.,
individual peculiarity, admits of far too much repetition.46 Therefore, Marx maintains that
it is not what individuals do qua individuals, but what and how they do it together that
defines them.
The human being is in the most literal sense a [political animal], not merely a
gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of
society. Production by an isolated individual outside society—a rare exception
which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already
dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness—is as much of an
absolute absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living
together and talking to each other.47
The social component in Marx is essential and that will become more and more
apparent as we advance. We have seen that Hegel believed that subjectivity and
consciousness becomes objective—something material—through the actions of the will.
Hegel, like others before him, thought this is how property came about. Marx sees things
fundamentally different from Hegel. He maintains that human activity is like language in
that it cannot develop outside of social interaction. Therefore, action, which is necessarily
collective action, objectifies not one individual, as such, but a society.
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Independently of whether Marx was interested in doing so, I suggest that it is the
process itself that makes it difficult to remain faithful to the unique material circumstance
of the individual. Nevertheless, I believe that what is lost is an adequate rendition of the
unique lived experience of the individual. I make this claim on the basis that, regardless
of what can be said empirically, each person may experience the same (e.g.) working
conditions differently. Whether my claim applies in every case is not the point; rather, my
point here, is to show that this is the case for Marx. The common denominator, therefore,
between “the early Marx” and the scientific Marx who authored the “critique of
capitalism,”48 is his consistent use of categories. As I noted above, Marx does not shy
away from employing this use of categories to create a view of all recorded history.
Famously he wrote,
The [recorded] history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class
struggles.49
The Manifesto is undoubtedly consistent with his view that the individual and their labor
is social. Nevertheless, it is equally valid to point out that there he uses categories, i.e.,
types of people and types of work, to construct an intellectual history. For example, we
see in The German Ideology when Marx writes,
In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces
and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing
relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive
forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth,
which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages…50
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The level of abstraction in this passage is evident because Marx points to nothing
particular. To put this in the Aristotelian notation, I outlined above: the phenomenon is
the mischief and the burdens felt by one class of people, the proletariat. Marx deals with
this evolution by pointing to the intercourse of productive forces in society to explain the
evolution of this state of affairs.
Finally, in perhaps the most scientific of Marx’s work, Capital, Marx confirms
what I suggested above. Namely, despite beginning with empirical observation, one must
use language abstractly to make statistically verifiable claims. The language itself
demands abstraction at varying levels. In Capital, Marx advises the reader to be willing
to learn something new despite the difficulty of his method. We may ask, if it is based on
observations, for the premises must be evident to the senses, the reader would expect the
contents of Capital to be plain and obvious. If the reader is well acquainted with the
mathematical equations used in the description of capital, it need not be complicated
work. However, the scientific method itself, as I suggested, requires specific language.
Moreover, Marx, who previously had only pointed us toward material
circumstance, had to admit, “But here [in Capital] individuals, are dealt with only in so
far as they are the personification of economic categories, embodiments of particular
class relations and class interests.”51 What we see is that scientific knowledge necessarily
abstracts from what is immediately available to the senses and proceeds to use the tense
and person of language to describe a world view. Because I set out only to show that the
use of categories is nothing strange for Marx’s empirical scientific inquiry, nothing more
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needs to be covered. Thus, we arrive at our second task: to explain how language
grammar does convey these ideas through the declension of nouns.
In the context of this thesis, Marx is due some praise. He believed that the corrupt
nature of social relations made out of a man one thing in life, for example, a fisherman. A
fisherman is an individual who represents a category of those who pursue the act of
fishing often or by trade. As a member of a category, the subject-noun, fisherman, does
not form a typical sentence composed of a noun and verb. The word fisherman is a type
of noun that denotes a type of being not action. Language can convey this difference
through the form of nouns. That is to say, you can be a specific type of person, or you can
do certain acts. Categories do this explicitly for the sake of knowledge. It is useful for a
king to know how many fishermen are under the employ of the generals, for example.
Marx, in Capital, attempted to understand the working of capital and the role of the
laborer in its creation. Laborer, however, is a type of being, and while it may seem trivial
that we can say “a laborer” instead of “a person who works,” Rosenzweig shows that it is
no small thing to categorize people. One example in the Marxist lexicon is the term
lumpenproletariat,52 which denotes the “rag-like” characteristics of those oppressed by
the capitalist system. I will talk about the issues with this in a later chapter. For my thesis,
when individuals are categorized—outside of the context of scientific inquiry—I will
refer to that as using their genitive being.
My concern with the use of categories in moral contexts is in line with the
communist vision in Marx. He complained that the capitalist mode of production
reinforced this notion that individuals represent a category or sector of labor. He, too,
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clearly saw this as a negative thing, and for that, I applaud his work. Whereas Hegel
praised such actualization of universals, i.e., that people be fishermen, hunters, etc., Marx
thought this label was “an alien power opposed to [man], which enslaves him…”53 Here
is Marx’s vision:
While in a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity,
but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today. Another
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening,
criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter,
fisherman, shepherd or critic.54
Marx had the intent of describing humans in the nominative case—as the doers of
actions. Marx’s use of categories overlooks that his language is categorial, and as we will
see in the following chapters, problematic. Nonetheless, his vision is something quite
remarkable and praiseworthy. It encourages us to focus on what people do and not on
what category we might feel they belong to. To put it grammatically, people ought to
exist, and consequently be recognized, as subject nouns which do verbs. At the same
time, he is saying that people should not have “one exclusive sphere of activity” nor be
considered “hunter” or “fishermen.” Marx is arguing that no person is merely a
representation of a category. Consequently, communities are different from categories of
people identified by any science.
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CHAPTER 2: THE GRAMMAR OF THE STAR
Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption provides for us a working example of the
application of the idea of “renovated grammar.” Namely, the analysis of the performative
function of grammatical structure, developed by Rosenstock-Huessy.55 The analysis consists of
exploring the power of grammatical structures to convey or transmit meaning alongside the
sematic and pragmatic capabilities of language. The idea itself is not unique; for instance,
developments in the field of linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century likewise
explored the ability of language to do more than describe the world. Pragmatism, a field that
studies the capacity of speech utterances to cause a change in the world, comes to mind when
there is mention of speech-act theory. However, as Gibb’s shows,56 Rosenzweig’s use of
language in The Star only somewhat correlates with the field of pragmatic linguistics.
Contrary to Rosenzweig, someone like J.L. Austin—a significant figure in linguistics—
believed that “there is no directly binding correspondence between the grammar of a sentence
and its performative force.”57 In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated how grammar is
capable of conveying similar ideas in both Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism. Moving
forward, I focus on Rosenzweig’s unique application of this “renovated grammar” through The
Star to propose a way of applying Rosenzweig’s philosophy of language to modern moral
concerns. To do this, I present a secular reading of some essential parts of The Star by focusing
on the human role in Rosenzweig’s account of reality. In continuation of the discussion of the
will in chapter one, I use the structure of language, in the context of Rosenzweig’s work, to
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further explain how I believe humans can live actively and passively. Following Rosenzweig, I
propose that language has the capacity of both categorially grouping individuals by type, i.e., the
genitive being I discussed with Marx, and of explaining how individuals willfully come together
as a community. More importantly, for my thesis, I assert that we ought to be cognizant of how
grammar, primarily the noun’s declension, seems to predispose our actions. I will return to this in
the latter half of this chapter.
Benjamin Pollock’s entry in the Stanford encyclopedia notes that Rosenzweig’s
intentions with The Star were not religious. He writes, “Indeed, Rosenzweig insists in numerous
contexts that the Star be understood ‘only as a system of philosophy,’ that is, as committed to the
very task of systematic thinking to which the German Idealists were committed.”58 Theological
as it may be, The Star can be more than mere religious doctrine. When read secularly, The Star is
a meaningful contribution to philosophy. In this way, we can set our sights on two significant
points running through it: Rosenzweig’s notion of a renovated grammar and the ethical
implications of its use in moral circumstances. In Rosenzweig’s view, the systematic
understanding of the world comes about through the “configuration of reality”59 in terms of
three “Elements” along with these elements respective “Courses.”60 My thesis requires that I
explain how the theological concepts in The Star align with a relatable experience of reality. In
each of the “courses” –creation, revelation, redemption—language is the organon through which
we arrive at a description of how these theological categories reflect certain kinds of experience.
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Rosenzweig uses these theological terms as categories that correspond to certain grammatical
concepts. For this, the following table61 is beneficial.62
Theological Concept Mood

Tense

Pronouns

Voice/Structure

Creation

Indicative

Past

He, She, It

Passive

Revelation

Imperative

Present

You, I

Mood

(none)

Name

Future

We, Ye—HE

Redemption

Cohortative, (Subjunctive)

Active

If indeed, these categories represent real relationships, they ought to align with how we
experience the world. Otherwise, it is hard to justify the corresponding grammatical categories,
as charted above. Rosenzweig is not merely claiming that language describes such relationships.
He claims the nature of each of the relationships is, at least in part, determined and structured by
the grammar of the speech that forms the respective relationships in question.
CREATION
The chart above illustrates the correlations between a grammatical category and the
theological category listed on the far-left column. Take, for example, creation, which is the
activity of describing how the world became the place that it is; revelation is the experience of
the present moment from the perspective of the I; the future as redemption is that which we
experience as something we must take upon ourselves to make through creating communities
and fulfilling a purpose.63 The notion of a renovated grammar does not begin with a paradox to
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be solved by logic or otherwise. It begins with the presupposition that historical narrativebuilding presupposes language. My task here is to address the question: in what way can we
experience creation, revelation, or redemption?
To experience the theological categories is not merely some religious experience.
Rosenzweig’s renovated grammar is innovative because it does not struggle to explain the
phenomenology of experiencing god’s creation. Instead, it lays out the grammar involved in
seeing the world as created. The argument for a secular understanding of this theological
category is: if creation is only a certain way that we use language to explain the world, and
everyone uses language, then everyone can experience creation. To make creation something
meaningful, Rosenzweig pits it up against another world view, which necessarily uses the same
type of language: Scientific Image of the World.”64
[t]o be recognized, the world is projected every time into the past… Occurrence is
not reduced to the changeable present. Rather, as in differential calculus, everything
must be brought down to the at-rest form, that is, the past tense, even the present,
the instant of movement…65
My position is that Marx has a world view which presupposed a scientific image. His work
exemplifies the objective sense of knowing the world. If we take a look at the claims in Part One,
Book Two of The Star, we find that Rosenzweig gives us reason to analyze Marx as we did in
the previous chapter.
For species and genus are concepts which are unconditional universalities only visà-vis their particularity, and so are community, nation, and state, if we may pass
into the human sphere; for the rest, however, all these concepts are units which can
very well unite among themselves into pluralities of categories, nations, states. Just
so, for its part, the individuum too is an individuality pure and simple only vis-àvis its category and for all that capable of representing a category—its category—
only because it already represents a plurality vis-à-vis the naked, blind particular.
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This plurality consists of at least two stipulations: the criteria of species and its own
peculiarity.66
Thinking in categories as Marx does, is indeed the result of knowing the world as
philosophers do. In Hegel, we have the culmination of all philosophic thinking in that Hegel’s
intention was to create a system in which all prior positions have a role to play in everything is.
What results is what we have seen in the last chapter, universal categories giving temporal
meaning to the material realities of the world. For example, for Marx, a worker is not one who
chooses to act in a certain way or under the direction of another, but someone who represents the
particular relationship among categories defined by thinking about the capitalist mode of
production. The problem with this view, as Rosenzweig sees it is that the concept of the
proletariat is something that can be validated insofar as reason contents that this is the way things
are. Creation admits only of a world “thus,” already here to be talked about and not generated
from the logical discourse of systematic philosophy.
Marx and Hegel both based their ideas on a system with which to understand all of
history. In so doing, their subject-matter is the product of logical generation. The claim is that a
universal concept gives rise to temporal material realities like the lumpenproletariat. In other
words, each system creates a world view which depends on the underlying logic. Rosenzweig
says that “Idealism, gave itself over completely into the power of its creature, logic.”67 Although
Marxist materialism is not idealism per se, it is nonetheless a system in which the individual
loses themselves within the presupposed logical structure. In the case of Marx, his judgment that
“[t]he [recorded] history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”68 only
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makes sense under the conditions that he is following a certain logic. For Rosenzweig, this
means that since they are entirely dependent on whatever logic they posit, their worldview at the
same time, “[loses] touch with that living existence [i.e., the person] which it had undertaken to
substantiate and to comprehend.”69
Grammatically, both creation and the scientific world view use the perfect indicative
tense. The difference is that creation uses speech to describe how the world came to be as it is.
The subtle distinction is that the spoken word replaces the symbolism of logic and, as
Rosenzweig understood it, mathematics. The spoken world comes to be through the narratives
that are formed by the sentences and dialogues we engage in. Rosenzweig’s Midrash of the book
of Genesis is significant because it points to the grammar of the spoken beginning. Such a
created world depends on sentences composed on the most elementary level of nouns, verbs, and
adjectives. I want to emphasize this is why, in the previous chapter, I suggested that nouns and
verbs were conceptual parallels to some of the logical concepts in Hegelian logic.
Language is uniquely suited to explain how we constructed the world because our stories
created it. The idea of creation rivals the concept of generation used in the principles of idealist
logic. Language allows us to see the world as “thus”70 because making sentences begins with
attribution. By predicating, we are affirming materiality, that something is there to be “the bearer
of the attributes.”71 Nouns are not representative of a presupposed category inherently, but
instead, this noun is dependent on language for its proper determination: is the subject of a
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committee member or the committee member. The work of the article is to fix a noun in space,
“it is this member here specifically, the member.” To come back to Marx, by considering the
language involved in narrative-telling, we differentiate the concept of the worker, i.e., this or that
person, from a subject representative of some category. Furthermore, describing the functions of
language, we are keeping our attention on the individual, without succumbing to the critique,
Rosenzweig has for systems thinkers like Hegel and Marx:
Really as this individual thing? It had, after all, been recognized only as a
representative of a category, and was a dark abstraction vis-à-vis the reality of the
attributes. How little it is in itself, an individual becomes clear as soon as we
consider the proper noun, the name.72
It has been language and how we choose to use it that gives us the ability to form an
attitude to have towards the world.73 The noun presupposes a case and becomes supremely
important because its article, whether definite or indefinite, tells us how particular of a subject
we mean, and the proper name is the most specific. The definite article points to the third
grammatical person. The subject’s role in our sentence is always relative to the case of the noun.
In creation, the language of narration, the noun must be an object, because it is what we are
talking about. We can think about indirect statements here: “the author of this thesis said, ‘the
member of the committee was given this thesis to judge.’” So long as my language describes
that you were given this thesis, the subject of the sentence “the member of the committee” is the
indirect object—in the dative case—who was given this thesis—in the accusative case—as the
direct object. This thesis is not the generation of some logical system, but a story about how, as
the author, I asked that you judge this work. This narrating activity is how Rosenzweig keeps in
touch with the world. Indeed, every country, culture, and society have their history.
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As the reader, to whom I gave this thesis, you represent only yourself. “The reader” is
“the pinnacle of […] objectiveness”74 because, in my narrative, it can only mean precisely one
person, you. The story of this thesis is simple, but it is not the result of the logical development
of the Idea, nor could the modes of production predict that it would be coming about. We may
ask, why should we care that such a simple story could not be resultant of any system of logic?
We should not, but posing such a question is, at the same time, an admission that these “systems”
do not consider the creative power of our speech-acts.
Returning to my example, I not only identified a particular person, namely, you, the
reader, but also created a relationship for you with the language I used. Rosenzweig’s point is
that mere identification does not in itself form a sentence. The case of the noun in this context is
of utmost importance because it creates several possible relationships. These grammatical
functions are challenging because we are no longer acquainted with the grammatical concept of
the declension and cases of nouns. In English, we know these forms of nouns simply as subject,
object of possession, object, and the indirect object. Namely, the nominative, genitive,
accusative, and dative forms of the noun. The cases of nouns allow language to relate words to
each other.
The final grammatical consideration here is time. In its infinitive form, the verb depicts
the concept of motion. It informs the listener that the act could have occurred in the past, is
occurring now, or that it will occur in the future. Much like nouns, verbs need determination
through which they are fixed to time by their tense. The objectivity of the third person is matched
only by the perfected state of the past tense. In creation, “[t]he perfect tense completes the

74

Rosenzweig, Star, 131

32

objectiveness of occurrence, as that of being is completed by the definite article and its thing like
character.”75 Together the perfect and the third person mean “double objectiveness.”76
Creation means that the “world possesses creatureliness, where ‘creatureliness’ means a
creature’s capacity to be continuously re-created.”77 Creation is the story we tell ourselves
through language about how we got to the place we are now. It naturally points to the perfect
indicative and rivals in purpose the scientific image of the world, which generates a logic to
explain it in this or that way objectively. The use of indirect statements here is entirely
appropriate because, even though I created the narrative of your being given this thesis, I referred
to myself in the third person, as the author. Thus, Rosenzweig says, “[s]omething new has
dawned. But something more than a self too—a soul?”78 By using the term soul, Rosenzweig is
alluding to an idea also found in Locke’s Essay,
1. Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as
well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his breast,
invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear.79
In the context of the concept of creation, the unrelated self takes the place of an object that is
observed, known, or talked about. The soul (Seele), however, is active in the sense that it
breathes out by speaking. In my example, this would be the hypothetical case that I utter with
speech, “you the reader are reading this thesis,” instead of writing it. The theological concept
renders the idea as such:
The breath of life has been breathed into man, but does he really exhale it too? Does
he speak? He is created speech-less. And again, we run up against that wall which
separates portent form sign, prophecy from miracle.80
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I mean not to imply that Locke and Rosenzweig have a similar theory of meaning, but
that they, in the excerpts I quoted are referring to the same quality to language: that,
“[t]he comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of
thoughts…[conveyed to others].”81 As a matter of theology, Rosenzweig captures these
ideas in two ways: for internal thought—or ideas, as Locke calls them—he points to
God’s monologue in the Genesis myth; regarding speech, he points to the dialogue of in
the Song of Songs. I find that the notion of indirect statements is helpful because such
language allows us to know that we are using a language’s narrative function.
REVELATION
As we leave behind the indirect statement of the fixed past, we move to what must come
before something is completed: a present moment. It is in this sense that Rosenzweig asserts that
“[h]e who has not yet been reached by the voice of revelation has no right to accept the idea of
creation as if it were a scientific hypothesis.”82 No one can narrate the past without having lived
the present beforehand because the past is a present moment that is standing still. In this sense,
Rosenzweig is correct in saying you have to have revelation before creation. The completed
present moment is the perfect indicative or the simple present of the ever-changing present; we
try to capture this through the present progressive.
Revelation seems to be the most difficult of the theological categories to explicate
secularly because the concept of god is such a central part of Rosenzweig’s explanation. In sharp
contrast with Hegel, who said, “[r]eason is the certainty which consciousness has of being all
reality,”83 Rosenzweig suggests that we leave behind logical or casual determination and look for
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something which causes things to occur only from the present moment. What sort of language
can create a present “here and now”? Previously I used indirect statements to make the point that
creation is about the testimony. As a theological concept, revelation seeks to identify which parts
of speech can fix our experience in the present. Rosenzweig explains the difference in our
experience of the present as action connected to the past but as more than mere testimony; this is
why indirect statements served us well before. In creation, the theological concept brings to light
the language of bearing witness, giving evidence.
Contrary to Augustine’s account of time, revelation as the language of the present is
much more than attention.84 The present tense is the experience of creating the perfect tense.
Rosenzweig’s view of the present also leaves behind any notion of “eternal laws;” instead,
revelation looks for the most present of experiences. Language is a temporalizing phenomenon
that summons the personal name of the subjects.
The theology is helpful here because the story of creation itself wonderfully describes the
coming to be of the past as something promised by the language of the present. Take for
example, “And God said ‘Let there be…’” While this phrase is in the simple past tense, it tells of
a past, “God said,” that can only be created by a present act, “let there be.”85 The claim is not as
brilliant as it might seem, but the distinction it makes is essential. I propose that Rosenzweig’s
view of the present is incompatible with the notion of causal determinism.86 Because what the
story in the biblical narrative of Genesis teaches us is that the present is continuous. It is creating
the past moment by moment. The concept of revelation tells us that the present is not as we tend
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to think of it; it is not the case that all immediate actions are determined by events that proceeded
them.87
The question is, what sort of actions are done without having been determined by past
events? The answer is loving one’s neighbor.
For Love alone is at once such a fateful domination of the heart in which it stirs,
and yet so newborn, initially so without a past, so wholly sprung from the moment
which it fulfills, and only from that moment.88
The question from a theological perspective is whether humans can act with divine love. My
response is simple, and here I agree with Gibbs on the matter, “Rosenzweig does not claim that
we will hear voices or see visions, that we will have some religious experience of the
numinous.”89 In terms of interpreting The Star and theologically, this might be up for debate, but
for my thesis, it is not a pressing issue.90 The question from a grammatical perspective is which
elements of grammar explain the present in terms of a loving relationship.
The first condition is the movement away from testimony; this implies moving into the
first and second person because the third person does not speak for itself. Love fits this condition
because it cannot be testified. For example, “the lover told his beloved that he loves her,” is not
an act of love is obvious. From a theological perspective, God could not declare his love through
a prophet because such love would be indirect speech. What Rosenzweig seeks instead is the
function of a direct statement. Gibbs accurately describes this situation, saying that Rosenzweig
moves to the imperative mood—from the indicative of creation—by the use of speech in the
imperative mood because this mood “orients me to another’s command of me.”91 Upon hearing
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the voice of another, which commands me, the imperative orients us to an existent relation, one
is directed to another’s voice; the command gives me direction. Rosenzweig’s insight is that his
analysis in revelation focuses on the imperative and not the present indicative. The preference is
not arbitrary, though Rosenzweig does not address this issue in The Star. If one is familiar with
The Star, it is clear enough why the indicative will not do in the context of the category of
revelation. Simply put, the present indicative allows for the subject to speak in monologue, and
we cannot create communities through monologue.
Therefore, engaging in dialogue becomes paramount for revelation because, while
monologue can be internally self-referential, dialogue includes another person. In other words,
dialogue cannot remain silent because it is an utterance from within to command another to
recognize one in a particular way. It is a matter of how the first and second persons, while
relating to each other, are limited to referring to the third person as an object. At its core, the
claim is that in dialogue, I is always opposite and responding to you. Simon explains the
grammatical relationship between the grammatical persons by saying,
The I, as subject of experience, is not a thing under things, as in creation, but is
determined to be radically individual, that is, so chaotically individual that it is not
capable of being classified as merely one among other things of the same species.92
And so, Marx’s attempt to understand the working person, the lumpenproletariat, is completely
inadequate in the context of Rosenzweig’s revelation.
Revelation is the claim that love is a dialogue expressed in the imperative mood that
captures a moment of the present that only exists as a pure moment. As I noted earlier about the
references to the speech acts of creation, revelation opposes to the objectivity of the past tense
and even the present tense testimony. Rosenzweig claims that “…the presentness of experience
92
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is only satisfied by the form of the command, originating, spoken, perceived, and carried out all
at one blow.”93 This “one blow,” in the context of an analysis of the subject of love, means that
“[a]ll true statements about love must be words from its own mouth, borne of by the I.”94
What I consider meaningful about the suggestion about love by Rosenzweig is his claim
that it must come by way of personal testimony but, more importantly, that it must be a
command expressed in the imperative mood. In the imperative mood, there is no past, no future,
only the present. The alternative, the hortatory subjunctive, might exhort one to love, but this
mood is not limited to addressing another in the second person and therefore is not uniquely tied
to the personal expression of the I. And the subjunctive mood, relates far too much to uncertainty
and even points ahead to the future. The imperative mood is limited to the present, and there is
no ambiguity of time for the command; “love me!” means “do it now.” What is further implied
by saying “do it now” is an important part of the argument, namely that the uttering the
command implies the concepts of space and time. Specifically, the response to the command of
love means for the beloved that she is no longer is concerned only with herself. The beloved
faces another who demands of her all of her attention in the present moment. The significance of
this should not be understated; it points to the possibility for the beloved to choose her actions
based on her present reality, not on her experience.
Space is just as important as time, and we can reiterate how the imperative command
calls our attention to another’s command of me. We can conclude that love is a present moment
that cannot be testified about but only experienced. The experience of love attends to the present
moment when another person responds to another’s expression of love. This expression is an
imperative command to leave behind one’s past and attend to the cry of the inner self as one
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person recognizes another. In this dialogue, we move to the use of grammar that attempts to give
a phenomenology of the personal name. As we move from a world of things among things, e.g.,
the workers among capitalists, we find that through Marx’s view, an individual is no more than a
thing that is part of the world, it does not yet “have its place in the world.”95 In revelation,
however, a lover's place in the world is now front and center; it is the beloved who has a
particular96 name and a particular history. And for the beloved, it is otherwise, the lover. At this
point, space, time, and grammar come together in one concept: the proper name.
Hegelian logic and Marxist materialism are indifferent to the proper name because reason
determines everything that is the case. From a grammatical perspective, we see that love, as an
imperative command, is perfectly suited for the demand of another personal name. The
imperative mood itself welcomes the use of the vocative case, which formally summons another
by name. The nominative I finds in the vocative (the proper name of another) its recognition in
another as more than a body to be named or categorized later. And so, through this dialogue
wherein another becomes my focal point, “…there can be no category for [my interlocutor] to
belong to; it is its own category.”97 But the imperative mood is more important than one might
believe at first glance even though the indicative also calls a person by their name. The
grammatical difference is that the use of the proper name in the indicative is not limited to
speaking to the person named. The vocative is limited to directly addressing the person whose
name is called. This grammatical distinction is lost in modern English, but the Latin exemplifies
this grammatical phenomenon perfectly:
•

Quintus (nominative) writes the poem.
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o
•

Quintus poema scribit.

Quintus (vocative), write the poem!
o

Quinte poema scribe.

Note how the Latin tells the reader and listeners that Quintus’ name changes when he is
addressed directly. In the English, the name remains unchanged despite the change in its
grammatical function. The difference between the declension of personal names is significant for
Rosenzweig.
The second reason why Rosenzweig is emphasizing the personal name is that the person
always takes up their own particular time and determinate space; Rosenzweig refers to the
former as midpoint and the latter as a beginning.
In the intricate world of things, there was no midpoint or beginning at all; the I,
however, together with its proper name, introduces these concepts of midpoint and
beginning into the world…[this person] The I, longs for orientation, for a world
which does not lie there in any old arrangement, nor flow past in any old sequence,
but a world which supports the inner order inherent in the sequence, but a world
which supports the inner order inherent in the I’s experience on the solid base of an
external order. One proper name demands others.98
In other words, through the use of objective language, which is a world where everyone
is a he-she-it, we would have a world in which the person always feels out of place. The
claim is not difficult to grasp; Rosenzweig asserts that grammar is used to connect one
person to another in more than just syntax.
If we create an objective world where everything is at odds with each other
(instead of in a relationship) people stand face to face in a battle to the death99. Grammar
gives us insight into the function of personal names. Understood through the theological
category, Rosenzweig’s point is that such an attachment for objectivity prevents one from
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seeing the other as they see themselves. The alternative view, the one considerate of the
personal name, is one where you are no longer just a reader to me; You are the reader
who has been called to judge this thesis by your name. The importance of dialogue is that
individuals are not spoken about but spoken to.
REDEMPTION
Throughout my interpretation of the first two theological categories, I referred to
you the reader either by using indirect statements or literally by using the personal name.
Given the nature of Rosenzweig’s work, it was quite appropriate that I do so. The
preceding two sections use the passive voice and indirect statements to explain the human
role in creation and revelation respectively. In creation, the human is the creation of God
or the representation of an empirically verifiable category. In revelation, the human
subject is the beloved, whose attention is called to the present in dialogue by the
imperative command. And now, in redemption, we point to the future to two additional
grammatical concepts: the active voice and the cohortative (subjunctive) mood. The
active voice represents the activity of moving beyond being an object of knowledge
(creation) and an object of love (revelation). In our context, it means engaging others
through the transitive verb to love. For this reason, Rosenzweig described redemption as
the departing from the paternal home of divine love and setting forth into the world.100 In
the previous section, I alluded to the cohortative mood by pointing to our—Jules, Steve,
and Josiah101—future coming together. I did so because the cohortative mood allows us
to distinguish one particular way in which communities of individuals come together.
Through the view of redemption, we understand those communities as something other
100
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than categories with representative members. I will return to this with the idea of limiting
ourselves to considering only our genitive being.
Redemption is likewise associated with the cohortative mood and future tense
because the activity of loving our neighbor and creating communities anticipates a future
spoken world wherein “the we and the ye [ihr]102 sink back into one single blinding
light.”103 With the experience of anticipation, we arrive at the grammatical analysis of the
future tense and the cohortative mood. We began with narration and found our way to
dialogue, but as we look to the future, our speech is now something more:
This time grammar emerges, not as narrative striving to proceed from the narrator
to the matter, nor as dialogue oscillating between two partners, but as a chant which
is enhanced with every stanza, and as an archetypal chant which is always the chant
of several parties.104
The language associated with coming together for singing is important for my thesis
because it provides us an alternate form of understanding the world around us. As
Samuelson explains, “…the critical feature here noted about redemption from this single
line of the prayer is that redemption is an expression of people formed into community
who no longer function in the world as isolated individuals.”105
Language grammar is unique in that it allows us not only to describe the hardworking people of the industrial revolution as exploited victims of a new mode of
production, but it also allows us to question our genitive being. However, that we can
question a category used to identify us is nothing unique to redemption, I will explore this
in more detail in the final chapter. In the previous chapter, however, I praised Marx for
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believing this was possible. The history of philosophy is no stranger to such ideas, like
Rosenzweig, we can understand the notion of challenging our being by Sartre’s famous
notion of “mouvaise foi.” In the context of redemption, this means that the future is the
anticipation of a better world through the active creation of communities, not the passive
representing of categories. The creation of communities is a task associated with the
future tense in a grammatical sense: the subjective mood differs from the indicative in
that it does not point out something that is the case. Instead, it is “the mood of potential,
tentative, hypothetical, ideal, or even unreal action.”106 The subjective mood has several
uses and forms, among which is the cohortative and the jussive subjunctives. Though
slightly different from each other, what I want to point out about them is that they allow
for commands in the first and second person, unlike the imperative mood. “Thus, the
concluding stanza of the chant of redemption begins with the We.”107
We create communities when we use speech to do two things: 1) identify the
widest conceivable circle of subjects and 2) identify the boundary of this circle through
the use of purpose. The theological categories are apt for the description of this process
because through the shared purpose of thanksgiving, they create a community to come
together and give thanks to God. The first premise, to identify a community occurs
through the speech-act, “let us,” because the subjunctive verb used here does not identify
a subject. Rosenzweig focuses on the idea that the subject is no addition of individuals
under a more extensive set because such a structure would be too much like the indicative
language of math and logic.
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In this context, the phrase “let us” is an act that brings together those who
willingly identify with the “us.” Rosenzweig’s idea is that those coming together remain
in the nominative case retaining their right not to be objectified.108 Grammatically, the
claim is that the plural subject wherein the individuals lose their uniqueness occurs in the
third person plural; that is, where the he-she-it becomes they or those or these. In a
community, the many persons do not become “they” because they are not objectified:
“The one who exhorts joins in the thanks,”109 in their way of giving thanks, so this group
is not “they” but “we.” The grammar used in forming a community is as follows; we have
a plural subject (nominative), transitive verb (in the subjective mood), an object
(accusative), and an indirect object (dative). Our speech act is “let us give110 thanks111 to
god.112” The idea that “[a]ll thanksgiving unites in the dative”113 is simple, those who
come together to offer something to a third person does not objectify another. The givers
never become objects themselves. The grammar is not overly complicated on its own, but
in the theological context, it points to the power of our speech acts to create communities.
These communities are those I will place head to head with communities created by
empirical analysis.114 In chapter three, I use the chicano community, which is defined by
empirically verifiable characteristics to exemplify this concept of empirical communities.
In chapter one, I referred to the communities as grouped by their genitive being.
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The theological categories are each connected to a grammatical tense. Whereas
creation was a narration of the past, redemption is concerned with the future. Through his
view of redemption, Rosenzweig answers the critique brought forth by Marx: “The
abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men is a demand for their real happiness.
The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition
that requires illusions.”115 Despite its religious nature of Rosenzweig's work, the concept
of the future kingdom that Rosenzweig talks about is not an illusion; it is a call to create a
better world out of the present world. The Neoplatonic dualism of The City of God116
misses the point of redemption because we are supposed to move beyond the idea of such
a dichotomy. “Redemption or The Eternal Future of the Kingdom” is not synonymous
with sit there and wait on God. Grammatically we are in the language of acting not
experiencing, in the active, not the passive voice.
The analogy of prayer and praise is quite fitting even in a secular context. If
redemption were an outcry for a better future, Marx would have raised a valid critique.
But the future is not about prayer because “all prayer, even the individual lament,
subconsciously cries out for the coming of the kingdom…”117 Praise, however, as we
outlined above, is a unison of voices, a chant. Rosenzweig says that “the [coming]
kingdom of God is nothing other than the reciprocal union of the soul with all the
world.”118 As a community, the individuals together sing in anticipation of future
accomplishments. The grammar agrees, the subjunctive mood is related to future
uncertainty. But if redemption were merely religious dogma, it would not produce a
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theory of social wellbeing that redemption turns out to be. I find my view is also in line
with Gibbs’s, who says, “Redemption is the forming of a universal community, the
emergence of a true community that can say ‘we.’”119 And the active voice begins with
the opening lines of the book on revelation: “Love thy neighbor.”120
Once again, the theological question is whether a secular reading is appropriate.
The answer cannot be a negative one because, on the one hand, the language of
redemption excludes the possibility of the individual taking sanctuary in religious
devotion: “Loved only by God, man is closed off to all the world and closes himself
off.”121 On the other hand, redemption is about creating a community through the love of
our neighbor. There is a significant connection with Hegelian logic and our grammatical
analysis of the voice of grammar. The passivity of a subject in both creation and
revelation seems to correlate with the Hegelian concept of the unhappy consciousness.122
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses the need for consciousness to recognize
and to be recognized. In that context, consciousness, certain of itself, remains in seclusion
resulting in a state of dissatisfaction. In other words, this is a person who can experience
the world with its perspective but remains unhappy; they could never leave their mark on
the world. Rosenzweig’s words towards this passivity are stern. They come in revelation
after the individual has become self-certain through dialogue in revelation: “The world
must close itself off against the arrogant seclusion of man. And instead of coming to life
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as discoursing figure, man, whom we already saw opening up [in dialogue], is swallowed
back into seclusion.”123
The opposing person is not, of course, the happy consciousness, it is the moral one. If we
look at the language-related with the command to love one’s neighbor, we will find three
subjects to consider: the lover, the neighbor, and the world. In this context, too, we must keep in
mind the developments of the previous sections, namely, the personal name and grammatical
voice. In common English usage, a neighbor is a person who lives near or next to another; a
person who occupies an adjoining or nearby house or dwelling; (more widely) each of several
people living close to each other, esp. in the same street, village, etc. Given our ability to choose
where we live, we might add, a person one chooses to live next to.
Ironically, it is often the case that we build privacy fences to live as if these neighbors did
not exist. For this reason, in this context, we aren’t satisfied with this definition of neighbor.
Perhaps the book of Matthew in the Bible expresses the right responsibility we should have
towards others. The second definition is better than the first, but we remain unsatisfied, for
neither seems to cover the technical term Rosenzweig uses to identify the neighbor. The latter
definition, though it is a moral command, it is only a “rule of conduct.”124 As we saw in the
section of revelation, love must be a new and undetermined act in the present moment. Moral
laws are grammatically different from engaging in the speech act of love that revolves around the
imperative command. The neighbor we ought to love is our locum tenens, according to
Rosenzweig.
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Returning to grammatical analysis, the verb in the phrase, tenens125, is a nominative
present participle of the verb to hold, to continue, and to keep on; thus, a neighbor is one who
continually and persistently (present tense) holds fast. While locum is referring to a position or
point in space, this noun is in the accusative case. Therefore, anyone who presently holds a
location is related to me as an object; they are there for me to act upon like any other person or
thing because locum is in the accusative case and thus necessitates a position in the sentence as
an object of the verb. The Latin here is helpful once more because the verb in the phrase locum
tenens is a present participle. Unlike verbs, which must agree with the tense and number of the
subject, present participles decline like nouns. Rosenzweig’s definition of neighbor suggests that
while the person is an object to me, they can remain in the nominative case. This neighbor there
for me to choose whether to objectify has a personal name! Rosenzweig’s point is that whether to
do so is a moral choice.
The question of who can take the place of locum tenens is equally clear because the
grammar dictates that place belongs to a person with a personal name. This anyone is the place
holder, who, notwithstanding their category, is neighbor. With a proper understanding of the
term “neighbor,” the following interpretation of the old imperative “man is to love his neighbor
like himself” comes to life.
Love goes out to whatever is nighest to it as to a representative in the fleeting
moment of its presents, and thereby in truth to the all-inclusive concept of all men
and all things which could ever assume this place of being its neighbor.126
The significance of the use of the nominative case for the neighbor cannot be understated.
The nominative case determines the subject who has a personal name. The command to
love one’s neighbor is the active participation and instigation of dialogue with others who
125
126

Present participle of the Latin verb Tenere.
Rosenzweig, Star, 218

48

I willfully see others as I see myself. The grammar is clear about it; my neighbor is
nothing less than I am myself:
Out of the endless chaos of the world, one nighest thing, his neighbor, is placed
before his soul, and concerning this one and well-nigh only concerning this one he
is told: he is like you. “Like you,” and thus not “you.” You remain You and you
are to remain just that. But he is not to remain a He for you, and thus a mere It for
your You. Rather he is like You, like your You, a You like You, an I—a soul.127
Redemption comes to a close by bringing together the various concepts we have
considered in this section. The claim, “The effect of love of ‘neighbor,’ is that ‘Anyone’
and ‘all the world’ thus belong together…”128 describes how speech creates communities
through the act of loving one’s neighbor. And lastly, the future tense associated with
redemption is the idea of bringing in what is to come to the present. The acts of
redemption should be understood through our language, but more specifically, our
speech. Because by creating a community, we at the same time constitute the limit of
such a community. But speech, and therefore love as well, are not limited to our
intention. He or she that is closest to me, is not an object but a person with a name. In our
redemptive attitude, our speech must indeed anticipate –look forward to the opportunity
to create—a future wherein Ye—those whose name I do not know— no longer stand as
opposed to “we.” With his speech Marx created the lumpenproletariat, with our speech,
we bring about a redemptive community: Redemption is the future realization of the
unity that Hegelian philosophy vainly claimed already existed, viz., the unity of the one
and the all (Der Eine und das All).129
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CHAPTER 3: CATEGORIES AND PURPOSE: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES
The final chapter of this thesis is a narrower focus on the community (Gemeinschaft130).
How do they come about, and what is the role of the individual in the community? The answers,
however, are not definitive; rather, they further the discussion on the connection between
language and communities. Marx131 taught the political scientist, sociologist, and economist a
particular way of conceptualizing the world. The grammatical consideration described in the
previous two chapters about this conceptualization does not challenge the virtues of such
conventionalization; it recognizes that its merits are a strength for the sociologist and the political
scientist, etc. However, if our interest is a moral one, does a Marxist conceptualization of the
world give us an edge? Tucker raises this question about Marx, saying, “[w]hat was the
‘philosophical opinion’ of Marx and Engels in regard to morality?”132 Then answers,
And, in truth, even if some may be able to write on the theory of knowledge
according to Marx, to write on the principles of ethics, according to Marx, seems
to be a somewhat hopeless undertaking…Marxism was strictly a demonstration [a
scientific image of the world] of certain historical cause and effect relations.133
Marx was too scientifically minded to consider himself an ethicist, but his ideas inspire action
and a vision for the future. Why else would the workers of the world unite, if not to lose their
perceived chains? Given that vision, I believe we are justified in showing the shortcoming of
Marxist ethics in the context of communities. As a counterpoint, I have offered an interpretation
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of the theological categories of The Star because I believe they, too, are meant to inspire change
through moral action.
I believe that non-theological sources collaborate with Rosenzweig’s position. For
instance, in his book Sapiens, historian Yuval Noah Harari gives “A Brief History of
Humankind.” His work demonstrates that based on historical empirical evidence that myths play
a significant role in the life of all humans. In a short but broad history of humans, Harari begins
with “The Cognitive Revolution.” This “revolution” was nothing short of miraculous if, by
miraculous, we mean defying the laws of biological nature. Harari writes of the ability of sapiens
to “bypass their genome.” One could compare this “revolution” with the concept of creation.
Both ideas focus a human’ “… ability to create an imagined reality out of words [which] enabled
large numbers of strangers to cooperate effectively.”134 Specifically, concerning my thesis, I
want to draw attention to Harari’s point about the plus side of the cognitive revolution, namely,
cooperation. Furthermore, given the secular interpretation of Rosenzweig’s theological
categories, I suggest that this comparison is appropriate on two levels, in the context of
community formation and in that it demonstrates that my thesis about the secular application of
Rosenzweig’s work is valid and useful.
Harari said that “[e]ver since the cognitive revolution, sapiens have been able to change
their behavior quickly without any need of genetic or environmental change.”135 And he is
correct to highlight that change that occurs against the genetic and environmental disposition of a
species is an essential quality of the species. The historical accounts of such changes, like those
argued by Harari, supports Rosenzweig’s explanation of human speech acts—our ability to
change ourselves and our world through language. This ability to create “imagined realities” is
134
135
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more significant than mere storytelling. Both Rosenzweig and Harari argue that such language
can create communities. In the Philosophy of Right, the corporation can be understood in similar
ways; it is the logical progression of the family on another level.
Based on my interpretation of Rosenzweig’s theological categories, I gather that we can
assume that if early humans created these “imagined realities,” it was because they anticipated
some type of future. For instance, we tell the myth of the corn god, so that in the present, we are
willing to pray to this god with the hopes of a future with abundant corn. In this sense, dialogue
can often point to the future. Such a rendering of Harari’s description of the cognitive revolution
is only one possible interpretation. However, I suggest that this historical take is not only
relevant but appropriate given the consequence of such activity: “Large numbers of strangers can
cooperate successfully by believing in common myths.”136 Without such communication, ancient
and modern sapiens would not be able to cooperate in numbers above 150, given that humans
today cannot effectively gossip about 150 human beings,137 much less create the world we know
today without these shared “invented realities.” On Harari’s account, without the cognitive
revolution, our world would not be what we consider to be.
It is noteworthy to point out the degree of convergence there is among our various
sources on this aspect of human nature. Consider Hegel’s phrasing, “[a]s spirit, the human being
is a free essence that is in the position of not allowing itself to be determined by natural
impulses.”138 Hegel does not use the language of the historian but says something remarkably
similar. There is something about humans that allows them to use their capacity as conscious
beings139 to act against the grain of the principles of their natures. Given the similarity in their
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claims, it is equally plausible that by nature of the stories, humans tell themselves they, in so
doing such a thing, “reconstruct” themselves. In the case of a historical account, we can then
envision humans, through their myths, become beings capable of creating a global system of
interdependence, although their biology allows for limited cooperation. In a Hegelian sense, “[les
humains] se concevoir soi-même en se comprenant.”140
The relevance of Harari’s perspective is the apparent ability of humans to transmit larger
quantities of information about the world, their social relations, and perhaps most importantly,
that they possess “the ability to transmit information about things that do not really exist, such as
tribal spirits, nations, limited liability, and human rights.”141 Interpreted secularly, the theological
concept of creation gives a linguistic account of the same activity, namely using speech and
language to tell ourselves about ourselves and our world to shape it.142 The relevance for
communities is much clearer: it is through convincing ourselves that we come together for a
purpose that we demonstrate the types of community participation that we can consider.
In order to say more about communities in general, I will describe two ways in which
one finds themselves in a community: 1) through their categorization as a member of such a
community and 2) through willful participation in a specific community. For the remainder of
this thesis, I will use the context of the Chicano community to describe some of the passive
criteria for membership in the community. I will show how such passive being serves the ends of
empirical scientists but perhaps not the ends of individuals facing moral choices. By describing
the conditions that make one a Chicano, I demonstrate that the criteria for participation in this
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community are not always obvious. Thus, perhaps passive participation in a community may not
be relevant for the normative charge of community building through the engagement in dialogue.
After all, building communities is what Rosenzweig means by the concept of redemption.
Community building should look past passive membership because of the limits it places on our
disposition to close the gap between “we and ye”—us and them.
My claim is that perhaps we should because it would be better, we should act towards
others, acknowledging that they stand for themselves and not as a representative of a category.
We should avoid being predisposed to avoiding a conversation with others based on arbitrary
features like those of skin color, native language, or place of birth. We might avoid being
negatively predisposed to engage in a conversation with them. If loving one’s neighbor is truly a
helpful guide to ethics, our willingness to have a conversation in the first place is quite relevant.
In this sense, maybe it is better to treat others as a neighbor and not reduce then to a category
they might passively represent. This thesis is not opposed to the study of culture and peoples; it
is clear that there is beauty in diversity. My claim is a response to our self-conditioning and
predisposition to see others as categories. The question of whether or not to dialogue with my
neighbor can be affected by this or that category; I have been conditioned to assigned to assign to
them.
The experience of being chicano in the era of the Donald Trump presidency is a unique
one. That administration has demonstrated just how vague—and by that fact, unhelpful—
categorizations are in a political and moral context.143 As far as chicanos are concerned, the
political tensions sparked by the use of these categories exemplify a reason to suggest that the
categorical representation of people is not useful in moral contents. The Human Relations Area

143 Comment on the complexity
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Files,144 compiled by researchers at Yale University, defines Chicanos “[as] a diverse group of
Mexicans born in the United States.” They add to this simple definition a very important
qualifier for my argument by stating that, “[m]any Mexican immigrants, especially children
educated in the United States, also identify with the term. However, many from both populations
refuse to identify with the label Chicano.”145 The question is whether it is valid to categorize
individuals by types when they may deny membership in this class? The answer to that question
is outside the scope of this thesis because it is possible to exercise a separate action without
strictly denying that categorization has value in areas other than ethics. The point is that maybe if
non-chicanos behaved towards chicanos as if they were not so, there would be no valid reason
for anyone to “refuse to identify with the label.” Yet, we insist on using these categories to
classify people.
Previously I talked Marx, how he set out to know the world scientifically to change it.
Marxism created of our social, political climate a dichotomy still alive and well today; this is
obvious from the strength of the political movement of a Vermont state senator, B. Sanders, who
said, “there is something profoundly wrong when the rich keep getting richer, and virtually
everyone else gets poorer. That is unacceptable, and that has got to change.”146 After Marx, tied
into what I am doing, given the tools, we have discussed in the previous chapters. We have a
political worldview understood through a bifocal lens of rich and poor. Marx wrote plenty
describing what made each man a capitalist. He observed them and learned the stories they told
themselves to justify their way of life. Similarly, I can now develop a phenomenon of chicanos.

144 (n.d.). Retrieved March 06, 2020, from
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As a chicano, I describe some ways in which I participate in the community. We have a
language; it is Spanish, but it is not the same as central American Spanish because our Spanish
screams, “I am not from your part of the world.” We speak English most of us, but with a certain
accent that confesses to others, “I am not from your part of the world.” Through our language,
we pass on stories about our ancestors, which mostly take the form of journeys to the United
States. It is the myth of social and economic prosperity that moved us here. To carry on this
interpretation, we could say that our natural animalistic drive for survival was tossed aside by our
ancestors in light of the great myth of the American Dream. Harari’s point will age well, we
believe things that are not real, and yet, we act based on them. My parents, like those of many
countless others, arrived in this country without speaking the language. Thus, many chicanos,
including myself, speak Spanish at home.
Using the tools of the analysis of this thesis, we can see that there are two ways that a
chicano participates passively in the community. Being born of a certain last name and
geographical area are passive activities. Note the grammar involved in this expression, “I was
birthed by my mother of Mexican descent in the United States.” In this case, it should be clear
why calling such community membership passive is entirely appropriate. However, there is a
sense in which, most, if not many, chicano people actively participate in their cultural activities.
In such cases, it is quite right to say that these people are actively participating in community
membership. For instance, the art of making tortillas is one that was sacred to the indigenous
people of Central America before the arrival of the Europeans to the continent. Notwithstanding
the lost devotion to the Aztec and Mayan gods, many chicano families practice the tradition of
making tortillas at home.
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The process, while simple, is quite involved. I mix flour, baking powder, salt, lard, butter,
and water. Then I knead the dough until smooth before parting out the mass into equal pieces and
roll them to a ball that fits in the palm. After a period of rest, my mother takes the dough and
stretches it out with a rolling pin. One by one, she stretches them as I lay them out on a hot pan
to cook. After they are all cooked, the entire family enjoys them in the meals to come. The
tortilla making, alongside all the other passive considerations of chicano culture, are sure signs
that I am a chicano. And in so far as I take part in the practice of making the tortillas, in the
context of learning from my parents for cultural reasons, I am actively taking part in being
chicano. The need for a different form of understanding communities is apparent from the fact
that despite all of the chicano culture I take part in, I can at any moment feel as if I am not part of
this community.
The circumstances I have laid out above are but two straightforward examples of both
passive and active participation of what I called “genitive being” in chapter one. Communities
based on possession of certain empirically verifiable qualities—such as skin color, native
language, and family origin—are all around us. For instance, the idea of the “token” person is an
effort to create the optics of inclusion of all categories of people. Furthermore, it seems as if
those studying cultures and peoples, develop these categories solely for the sake of knowing.
Non-chicano people can major in chicano studies and know more about this category than
someone who fits the empirical criteria for membership. The phenomenon is called cultural
appropriation. To what degree they find data about chicanos is useful outside of their field is for
the sociologist to say.
An attempt at creating a normative theory from social data is not a strange concept. Many
of the issues related to the use of categories hide under the guise of social justice. This concept in
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itself is an issue outside of the scope of this thesis, but it is helpful because it highlights the issue
at focus here: generalizing categories (genitive being) are not an ideal guide for moral choices. In
an article called What Is Social Justice? Implications for Psychology, Thrift and Sugarman,
discuss the complicated nature of social justice and the problems this concept brings for their
field. At its core, the problem is that progress is difficult because the issue is far too complex and
historically anchored to its epoch. Non the less, I think the APA took the right approach because
they asked the right question:
How does psychological theorizing, research, or interventions help create social,
cultural, political, and economic arrangements that permit individuals to participate
on an equal level with their peers?147
The question demonstrates that at its core, an individual promotes social justice and is
better able to make moral choices in general, when they view people as individuals and not parts
of collectives. The underlined section of the APA’s question is the point. Our grammatical
analysis shows that treating people rightly—a moral issue indeed—is a question of whether we
are willing to dialogue with them in the first place. As Rosenzweig would agree, how individuals
act toward their neighbor, i.e., the person standing closest to them, is the underlying structure
behind true social justice. The phrase, “there cannot be an A-difference without a Bdifference”148 explains the nature of supervening relationships. It would seem this concept helps
us to understand one way to measure social progress and social justice. However, my position is
that in terms of the larger ethical picture, whether ethics supervenes upon some kind of empirical
data—like the creation of capital or estranged labor—is irrelevant because that would suggest
that there is some a total sum of ethics in the first place.
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An ethics based on the analysis of language suggests that hypotheticals cannot solve
morality because the question of whether we would, has nothing to do with the spontaneous
nature of sparking up a conversation with whoever happens to be closest to us. To rephrase my
thesis in another way, this is a question of whether I am willing to have a conversation with the
person standing next to me. For this reason, the idea of a measurable level of social justice,
whatever that may be, is problematic because we cannot show that a total sum account of the
state of our morality exists.
Rosenzweig’s concept of community is better suited because it locates morality with the
individual. After all, redemption is a moral prescription that has two essential components: the
cohortative and the dative. In chapter two, I interpreted these grammatical components to show
how it is that communities come together. It is important that creating communities focuses on
the right side of the supervening relation; that is, on the one-to-one relationship. As it relates to
the chicano these concepts are important because one cannot act in any way towards the chicano
community per se. The position that I am defending is that one can only act towards individuals
who might actively or passively participate in chicano community.
Similarly, in this interpretation of the spirit of redemption, an important point to consider
is that one does not primarily—or morally—create communities by identifying common features
of external contingencies, like a place of birth and primary language. The theological categories
in Rosenzweig’s philosophy are one example of using language to explain how humans build
communities. Harari’s work is one example of the overlap between Rosenzweig and secular
scholarship that corroborates my position. In my example, both sources agree, we should,
because it would be better, act towards others by acknowledging that they stand for themselves
and not as a representative of a category. I mean that we ought to act in such a way because it is
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the first step we take in building a community. Harari would argue that speech-acts and creating
common myths and purposes allows for the kind of cooperation that allows humans to build the
communities they have historically.
The famous trolley problem can demonstrate our attachment to what I am calling a
‘genitive being’ if we could show that the person with the lever made their decision based on
what type of people might be harmed if the lever was pulled. 149 If one of our students responded
to this ridiculous thought experiment with “I’d pull the level in this or that way, depending on the
type of people that would be harmed as a consequence,” we would be appalled. The thought
experiment I find of little value except to show that my conclusion could be said to lack an
interest in sparking dialogue with your neighbor. The moral point is that basing our moral
choices on categories is ridiculous when we think about it but goes unnoticed in our daily lives.
Among other things, the use of categories to understand the people around us leads us to
rely on stereotypes to guide our moral choices. In a comedy skit entitled, Racist Grandmother
comedian George Lopez says, “my grandmother was a racist, la cabrona. Like all your
grandmothers, racista!” What Lopez is pointing out is the general disapproval of Mexican
grandmothers to invite people of dark skin into their families or homes. I find this to be the case,
particularly when a female family member dates a person of color, and how in such cases,
grandma would disapprove. In cases of this sort, although anecdotal, grandma bases her
judgment on contingent factors, like skin color, and most people disapprove of these attitudes.
That is, they laugh because of the recognition of their common humanity, namely, feeling guilty
about the fact that such is the case with their grandmothers. The disposition to have a
conversation and whether or not someone of a different color is welcome in our home—even in a
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home of people who, ironically so, brown-skinned is a problem. I suggest that our conclusion to
the trolley problem illuminates this point. Our answer to the trolley problem matters because it
might show us our disposition to talk to certain types of people so that it does not go
unquestioned.
The APA and Rosenzweig are both right to approach social issues from the individual
and then upward. I suggest that even if the state of social justice supervenes the one-to-one
relationship among individuals, we ought to focus on the latter. Consequently, I think
Rosenzweig’s theological concepts are more useful in moral contexts, particularly when the
alternative is a focus on understanding people by their externally contingent qualities. In The
Star, interpersonal relationships begin with dialogue. Through language, we have the appearance
of the immaterial subjectivity of those who speak to each other. Immaterial can be misleading,
but it is nothing mystical: I am talking about the grammatical person, not what some might call
the ego, soul, or spirit. The normative charge of the theological concepts revolves around the
consequences of our ability and willingness to dialogue with others. Through dialogue, I
discover that “I am”—the first grammatical person; the dialogue allows me to see myself as “I”
because through my speaking “I,” I address a “you”—the second grammatical person. From an
analytic perspective, the grammatical persons are immaterial categories; however, they are
grounded in the material conditions of an interpersonal relationship. The problem for the
empirically minded, or those mindlessly thinking of others as types, is that their approach to
ethics does not recognize the other as its nominative subject:
“Like you,” and thus not “you.” You remain You and you are to remain just that.
But he is not to remain a He for you, and thus a mere It for your You. Rather he is
like You, like your You, a You like You, an I—a soul.150
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If I fail to engage in dialogue with the person that is next to me at any given moment,
how can I be expected to create communities? If I see myself as chicano, how is it possible to
feel as equal to the chinos who operate the shops downtown? The answer, if I were to point out
the empirical data, is no. At the very least, I am inclined to say so because I do not share in their
skin tone, place of origin, and facial features. The chinos may feel the same way about me.
Under the prescriptions of revelation and redemption, they sell me their goods, or providing me a
service does not exactly lead to creating a community. If I am to approach the chino as a
neighbor, I must be willing to approach this person not as a type, but as a nominative subject—
that is, as one who has a personal name. Doing so might be difficult when we are conditioned to
see the world around us as categories.151 In a sense, we automatically see the subjects as
different, even on a grammatical level. Consider that the nouns would be in a difference
declension were English to decline nouns. In the sentence, “The chino sells the chicano the
soccer ball.” The subject, chino is in the nominative case, the object, the soccer ball, is in the
accusative case, and the indirect object, the chincano, is in the dative case. For that reason, my
claim is a moral one. We ought to see them as nominatives, because they are, even if they can
take the place of the object in the accusative case or indirect object in the dative.
Hegel maintained that the treatment of property through contracts, like my paying for the
chino’s merchandise, is a moral affair. Although I believe Hegel made a valid point, he possibly
overlooked one important aspect of dealing with property and contracts: that contracts
themselves presuppose dialogue. 152 Hegel wrote in The Philosophy of Right that,
Reason makes it just as necessary for human beings to enter into contractual
relations—giving, exchanging, trading, etc.— as to possess property. Although
what they are conscious of is that they are led to make contracts by need in general,
151
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by benevolence, utility, etc., what does the leading , in itself, is reason namely, the
idea of the real existence of free personhood (‘real’ here meaning ‘present in
willing’). Contract presupposes that the parties entering it acknowledge each other
as persons and property owners. Because this is a relationship of objective spirit,
the moment of acknowledgment is already contained within it and presupposed by
it.153
What I am suggesting is that generally, contracts do indeed presuppose that the parties entering it
acknowledge each other as persons, but this recognition occurs before the development of the
property. In the previous chapter, I gave an interpretation of the grammar of dialogue because I
believe this is what Hegel overlooked.
[Contract] by an isolated individual outside society […] is as much of an absolute
absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and
talking to each other.154
The quote above is from Marx’s Grundrisse, but I have replaced “production” with
“contract,” to assert that language is needed to make contracts. But more specifically, to
raise the question for Hegel of whether the sale of goods in a chicano community by a
merchant of Asian descent creates a moral community? As a work in political theory that
is grounded in or leads to a particular kind of ethics, my point is that The Philosophy of
Right overlooks the importance of dialogue. I suggest the same is the case with Marx’s
political theory and the ethics derived from it. Consequently, if I see the merchant as it (a
subject in the third person), I could still do business with them without offending right or
law. However, only by recognizing their proper name—by considering them an I with a
personal name and history—am I able to begin the foundations of a moral community. If

153

Ibidem. In this context Hegel means that one’s subjectivity (their willfulness) is objective because it is now
recognized by another through the recognition of their property.
154 Marx, Marx and Engels Reader, The Gruindrisse, 223

63

any science, be that political or biological, gets in the way, we must recognize it as
counterproductive to the moral end of building communities.
Moral communities have one thing in common: the dative case. The declension of
nouns is uncommon now, so it will be more practical to say that communities come
together for a reason. The dative case denotes the recipient of a direct object. Rosenzweig
was correct in using the religious context of thanksgiving to make this point. The
congregation comes together to give thanks to god. It is in this sense that where I was
born could not create a moral community. Take, for example, the chicano civil rights
movement of the 1960s. The many people of the movement were not a moral community
because they were chicanos. Quite the contrary! They came together to give authorities a
piece of their mind: “we will not be treated as a lessor because of our heritage!”
Understood in this way, such movements are fighting the very thing I argue, the
categorization of individuals by type. The grammar is clear, the chicanos who are born of
Mexican parents and make tortillas are a passive community: “they have brown skin and
make burritos.” But the chicanos that came together to fight their categorization as a type
of people are a moral community. Unfortunately, these chicanos themselves, despite
activity participating in a moral community with a purpose, have been conditioned to
miss the point being made here. This might explain such battle cries of chicano people
like, “Viva la raza!” (let our race prevail!).155
Finally, we can conclude by pointing out the major themes of this thesis. The first
chapter demonstrated how the work of both Hegel and Marx could be understood in
terms of grammar. In other words, the logical concepts at work in the philosophy of both
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philosophers have correlating concepts in the logical structure of language. The second
chapter explains the concept of renovated grammar developed by Rosenzweig in The Star
of Redemption. Through a secular reading of his work, we can identify the role of
language in three important aspects of human life: our history, our neighbors, and our
community. In so doing, I explain in what way tense, mood, and voice relate to our moral
responsibility.
The point of identifying the reasons why we use the perfect indicative tense is a
moral one: the past ought not to determine the present, it is our present that makes the
past. The difficulty of capturing the present is difficult because it is always passing us by.
According to Rosenzweig, the imperative mood can give an account of experiencing the
most present moment. The nature of the imperative mood is such that it does not rely on
the past; the imperative is a timeless tense because it must be born of the moment. In the
context of love, the grammatical analysis becomes a moral affair because it involves a
second person. It is through this dialogue with another that one can recognize the
relationship between the persons of grammar, i.e., the first and second persons, I and
You. As indicated in chapter two, redemption is the process of creating communities by
actively sharing a purpose. In this final chapter, I have given an account of the difficulty
of creating these communities under the scientific worldview. Empirical verification
necessarily focuses on the contingent aspects of a person’s being. I have called this the
genitive being.
Given Rosenzweig’s background in theology, it seems only natural that he chose
the context that he did, that is, religion, to express his ideas. In fact, for those who share
his faith, there is no question about whether this text has a religious application. From a
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linguistic approach, a secular reading seems just as likely because nothing about using
language to understand our past, present, and future seems exclusively religious. This
thesis demonstrates that language has a place in semantic interpretations of a speech
utterance. Grammar, like logic, should be considered by the philosopher if there is even
the slightest possibility that it could help us achieve the best possible moral outcome.
Thus, the conclusion to the three-part argument is not a definitive, normative “ought.”
Instead, it is a question: “if our scientific approach to understanding communities is
blinding us to the reality of how communities are built in the first place, should we not
reconsider the level of influence these sciences have on our moral choices?
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